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Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams
Scientific theory and technology are undergoing rapid development.
Courts are presented with ever increasing quantities of highly
sophisticated novel scientific evidence. Because scientific evidence must be
valid and reliable to maximize correct factual conclusions by the jury,'
evidence obtained from newly ascertained or newly applied scientific
principles has traditionally been subjected to a special standard for
admissibility. As a precondition to admissibility, courts required a
showing that the principle underlying the evidence to be introduced had
attained general acceptance within the scientific community in which it
belonged. Against the background of developing science, difficulties in the
application of the traditional standard and a change injudicial philosophy
concerning the capability of jurors to evaluate novel scientific evidence
have raised the significant question whether another standard might be
more appropriate.3
The question was answered in the affirmative in State v. Williams,4 in
which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine rejected the traditional
"general acceptance" standard. In its place, the court ruled that expert
testimony concerning newly ascertained or newly applied scientific
principles be admissible into evidence only when "the testimony to be given
is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 5
The Williams decision reconciles scientific advancement with judicial
philosophy and underlying policy considerations. It will be argued in this
Case Comment that the Williams standard is preferable because it is more
consonant with the policy considerations of providing a clear standard of
review, ensuring uniformity of decision, minimizing erroneous factual
conclusions by the jury, and providing the defendant with an adequate
opportunity for rebuttal. In addition, it will be argued that the Williams
standard minimizes difficulties in interpretation to a greater degree than
does the traditional standard.
I. THE Williams DECISION: FACTS AND HOLDING
An anonymous telephone call was received and routinely recorded by
1. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 ILL. LF. 1, 4, 9.
2. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. Professor McCormick suggests that general acceptance is an inappropriate standard for the
admission of novel scientific evidence: "'General Scientific Acceptance is a proper condition for
taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclusion." C. McCoRasCK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAWOF EVIDENCE§ 203, at
491 (2d ed. 1972).
4. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
5. Id. at 504.
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the Augusta Police. The caller stated that a bomb was going to exllode at
the Augusta State Airport. A police officer recognized the recorded voice
as that of the defendant, Williams. Later that day, at police request,
Williams read aloud a transcript of the original anonymous call and, with
his agreement, the reading was recorded. Subsequently, both recordings
were submitted to Dr. Oscar Tosi, Professor of Audiology and Speech
Sciences at Michigan State University, and Lieutenant Smrkovski of the
Michigan Department of State Police Voice Identification Unit, for the
purpose of making a voice identification based on speech spectrograph
analysis.
Williams was indicted and tried for terrorizing.6 Expert testimony was
given by Dr. Tosi in explanation of the nature, reliability, and scientific
acceptance of voice spectrography. Testimony in opposition to the
admission of evidence obtained through the use of spectrography was
presented by defense witnesses Dr. Louis J. Gertsman, of City College in
New York, and Faulsto Poza, a consultant to the Stanford Research
Institute. Following presentation of the preliminary testimony, the trial
judge ruled, over Williams' objection, that the spectrographic evidence
would be admitted. The ruling was based upon the establishment of an
adequate and satisfactory foundation that "(1) voiceprint identification
has such scientific acceptance and reliability as warrants its admissibility in
evidence, [and] (2) the experts whose opinions were here being sought as
evidence were qualified to assist the jury in its determination."7
Accordingly, specific spectrographic evidence was adduced through
which both Dr. Tosi and Lieutenant Smrkovski positively identified the
recorded unidentified voice as belonging to Williams. At the conclusion of
all the evidence the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Williams appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine8 assigning
as error the admission of the spectrographic evidence. The defense argued
that the method was not a generally accepted scientific means of voice
identification and that the evidence obtained by the method was unreliable
for forensic purposes. The court, declining to apply the widely-adhered to
standard of "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,"
held the standard of admissibility for novel scientific evidence to be
"whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Justice the testimony to
be given is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."9 The spectrographic principle was
determined to be sufficiently reliable to qualify as relevant and the expert
testimony concerning it was determined to be useful to the trier of fact.
Under this standard, the court found that the spectrographic evidence was
6. Defendant was accused of violating ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210 (West 1978).
7. 388 A.2d at 501.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 504.
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properly admitted. Consequently, the court denied the appeal of Williams
and affirmed the judgment.
Justice Nichols filed a concurring opinion 0 in which he advocated
retention of the traditional standard of Frye v. United States." He
concluded, however, that the spectrographic evidence should have been
admitted under the Frye test.'
2
To apply the new standard set forth in Williams, the trial judge will
make a determination whether the proffered evidence is relevant and will
be of aid to the trier of fact. When evidence based on newly ascertained or
applied scientific principles is proffered, "a stronger showing may become
necessary before the presiding Justice is satisfied that the preconditions of
admissibility, in terms of relevance and helpfulness to the factfinder, have
been met."' 3 To determine whether novel scientific evidence meets the
stronger showing of relevance and usefulness, the trial judge may see fit to
consider "whether or not the scientific matters involved in the proffered
testimony have been generally accepted or conform to a generally accepted
explanatory theory."' 4 Thus, the traditional standard is modified and
incorporated into the Williams standard. Under the traditional standard,
however, the trial judge is absolutely bound by the presence or absence of
"general acceptance," whereas under Williams, the trial judge has
discretion to consider general acceptance if it is appropriate either "(1) to
avoid prejudice which might arise because the assertion that the principle,
or technique, has a 'scientific' basis may import an objectivity which could
unduly influence the jury as a lay fact-finder or (2) to assist the presiding
Justice in his responsibility to determine relevance.""5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Williams standard displaces the traditional test of admissibility
originally formulated by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in Frye v. United States.'6 Frye was convicted of murder and on
appeal he assigned as error the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony
of defendant's' expert witness regarding the results of a deception (lie
detector) test administered to Frye.
The concise opinion elucidates the court's reason for excluding
evidence of the deception test results:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
10. Id. at 505-07.
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. 388 A.2d at 506.
13. Id. at 504.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psy-
chological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus
far made.
17
No authority was cited in support of the court's conclusion. Still, "general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" became the
standard for the admissibility of newly ascertained and newly applied
scientific evidence.
The Frye standard has since been applied to many types of novel
scientific evidence.' 8  Recent examples include neutron activation
analysis,' 9 psycholinguistics test,20 ion microprobic analysis,2' spec-
trographic analysis, 22 and a new test for detecting a lethal dose of
succinylcholine chloride.23
When the admission of novel scientific evidence under the Frye
standard is in issue, the trial judge hears preliminary testimony for the
purpose of determining whether the standard for admissibility is satisfied.
Preliminary expert testimony is presented to provide elaborate exposition
of the theory and demonstration of its practical working,24 reliability of the
test,25 and currency and status within the relevant scientific community.26
The judge then decides whether an adequate foundation of general
acceptance has been laid to warrant admission of the evidence.
Certain difficulties have arisen in the application of the Frye standard
because the standard may be interpreted in various ways. One difficulty
concerns the meaning to be given the language "the thing from which the
17. Id. at 1014.
18. See, e.g., Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528,68 So. 2d 2(1953) (drunkometer); State v. Valdez, 91
Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) (polygraph); People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d
251 (1958) (nalline test); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 110 A.2d 588 (1954) (polygraph); State v.
Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957) (narco-analysis); Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633,16
A.2d 80 (1940) (blood grouping tests), overruled by Curtese v. Curtese, 10 N.J. Super 152, 76 A2d 717
(1950).
19. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S. 994 (1971); State v,
Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972).
20. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
21. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
22. United Statesv. Addison,498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d
130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
23. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120(1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
24. State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 658-59, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (1933).
25. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323,333,239 A.2d 680, 685 (1968), afl'd, 56 N.J. 16,264 A.2d
209 (1970).
26. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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deduction is made." Two interpretations have developed under this
language. Some courts have found the underlying scientific theory to be
the thing from which the deduction was to be made27 and other courts have
adopted the opposite interpretation by finding the device to be the
"thing.' 28 Professor McCormick notes, as a possible third interpretation,
that the "thing" might not be the device but the qualification of the expert
interpreting the results of a test conducted using the device.29 Under the
first interpretation, the theory must be generally accepted in the scientific
community to which it belongs. If the theory is generally accepted,
admissibility of results obtained from a particular device is governed by no
special standard of admissibility.30 Under the second interpretation, in
which the device is the thing from which the deduction is to be made, the
general acceptance of the device must be established in addition to the
general acceptance of the theory. The significance of the difference in
interpretation is readily apparent because it may be determinative of
whether that particular type of novel scientific evidence is admitted.
A second difficulty concerns what is meant by "general acceptance."
Evidence may be admitted even though acceptance is not uniform;3
general acceptance does not require unanimity. This conclusion is
premised on the probability that every scientific theory has its critics. In at
least one case, only one expert gave testimony attempting to establish
general acceptance.32 The court in that case, however, held that although
general acceptance does not require that certainty of the theory and
reliability of novel scientific evidence be "shared by all commentators and
scientists in the field, 33 the opinion of one expert "alone, will not suffice to
permit the introduction of such scientific evidence . . . .Admissibility of
the evidence depends upon the general acceptance of its validity."
34
General acceptance may also not be established without the testimony of
"disinterested scientists . . . whose livelihood [is] not intimately con-
nected with" the new technique.35 While it is established that "neither
infallibility nor unanimous acceptance of the principle" is necessary to
justify admissibility, 36 it is clear that the meaning of "general acceptance"is
ambiguous.
27. See, e.g., People v. Bobczyk, 343 111. App. 504,99 N.E.2d 567(1951) (theory that intoxication
can be determined from alcohol content in the blood).
28. See, e.g., People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270,38 N.W.2d 322 (1949) (device was blood alcohol
breath test drunkometer).
29. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 490.
30. A proper foundation for the introduction of test results consists of establishing the accuracy
of the particular device at the time the measurement is made, the qualifications of the operator, and a
proper administration of the test. State v. Miller, 64 NJ. Super. 262, 270, 165 A.2d 829, 833 (1960).
31. McKay v. State, 235 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
32. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
33. Id. at 229, 369 A.2d at 1280.
34. Id. at 231, 369 A.2d at 1281 (emphasis in original).
35. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 376, 255 N.W.2d 171, 180 (1977).
36. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 198, 327 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1975).
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A third difficulty of the Frye standard concerns identifying "the
particular field" of science to which the evidence belongs. Wigmore merely
states that the particular field be in the witness' "branch of learning. 3 7 The
court may simply require that the test "have gained acceptance in the field
of learning in which [it is] in use. 38 Some courts have been more explicit
and have stated that the Frye standard would be satisfied if the principle is
generally accepted "by those who would be expected Io be familiar with its
use."39 More recently, "particular field" has been interpreted to require
acceptance by "those scientists active in the field to which the evidence
belongs."40 The standard is satisfied when recognition of reliability is
accorded by a "specialty" within the general field of science. This may
minimize to some extent the controversy over who would be expected to be
familiar with the application of the principle or who is a competent
authority in the field. It is nonetheless uncertain when a particular group of
scientists constitutes a sufficiently particular field to be a specialty within
the meaning of the Frye standard.
The different interpretations of the language of the Frye opinion have
given the courts no clear standard to apply. The lack of clarity in the
standard has given rise to inconsistent results, 4' demonstrated by judicial
treatment of spectrographic voice identification evidence. In Hodo v.
Superior Court,42 the California Court of Appeals held that spec-
trographic analysis was generally accepted. More recently, in People v.
Tobey,43 the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that spectrographic
analysis had not yet achieved general acceptance.
Under special circumstances an intermediate standard of admissibili-
ty may be applied. The special circumstances include admission of novel
scientific evidence when the court sits without a jury44 or for the narrow
purpose of establishing probable cause to issue arrest and search
warrants.45 In these unique situations the danger of possible jury
incompetence does not arise. A less restrictive standard may be
appropriate in these special circumstances since the policy considerations
differ from situations with a jury trial.
37. 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 659, at 771 (3d ed. 1940).
38. People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 860, 331 P.2d 251, 253 (1958),
39. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1975).
40. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 231, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1977).
41. The traditional standard has been criticized for the inconsistent results that have obtained
under it. See Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence-Out of the Frye Pan and Into
Admissibility, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 314,365 (1977); Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientf/icEvidence in
Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 325 (1963); Strong, supra note 1, at 14.
42. 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
43. 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977).
44. United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
45. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
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III. ANALYSIS OF Williams
A. Rationale of the Decision
The Williams court, adopting a new standard of admitting novel
scientific evidence that is relevant and useful to the jury, effected the
provisions and basic spirit of Maine's new Rules of Evidence.46 Two
justifications were given for use of this standard. The first justification,
discussed earlier in this Comment,47 is the difficulty experienced by courts
in applying the traditional Frye standard; the second justification is
derived from the court's construction of the Maine Rules of Evidence. The
rules were enacted in 1976 with the purpose of the "promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 48 Continued application
of Frye was not wholly consistent with this goal. The underlying
philosophy of the Maine Rules of Evidence "was that there should be a
greater liberality in the admission of evidence, thus demonstrating
confidence in the ability of Maine jurors to appraise the strength and
weakness of testimony which had been excluded at common law. .... 49
The court considered the fundamental philosophy of the Rules of
Evidence together with its language. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements or
as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules
applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."50 Relevant evidence is that which has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 51 The general rule for admissibility is read together with Rule
702, which specifically pertains to expert testimony: "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."52 Ironically, one
commentator noted, before Williams was decided, that Rule 702 would
not affect the law on the admission of novel scientific evidence. 3
46. 388 A.2d at 503.
47. See notes 27-40 and accompanying text supra.
48. ME. R. EvID. 102.
49. Field, The Maine Rules of Evidence: What They Are and How They Got That Way, 27 ME.
L. REV. 203, 207 (1975).
50. ME. R. EvID. 402.
51. ME. R. EVID. 401.
52. ME. R. EvID. 702.
53. With specific regard to the lie detector, spectrograph, and blood tests forintoxication, see P.
ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 28484.4 (1977).
Although Rothstein directed his comments to FED. R. EvID. 702 (identical to ME. R. EvID. 702), it
provides an interesting indication of the expectations of the effect of Rule 702 on the law of the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Federal courts would do well to take note of the Wlliams
decision.
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Rule 40354 provides for a balancing of probativeness or relevance
against other factors that are counterweights to admissibility. 55 Exclusion
under the Rule will not result if the counterweights merely "outweigh"
probativeness but only if they are "substantially outweighed." Similarly,
mere "prejudice" is not sufficient to merit exclusion; only "unfair
prejudice" is sufficient.
There is no specific provision made in the Rules of Evidence for the
admissibility of newly ascertained or newly applied scientific principles.
The court, in Williams, rejected defendant's argument that the lack of a
specific provision is a gap that should have been filled
by establishing an additional precondition of admissibility as applicable
specially to the situation in which proffered expert testimony will rest on a
new ascertainment, or new application, of scientific principles-this further
condition to be that there must be "general acceptance" of such newly
discovered scientific principle ...in the relevant scientific field.56
Rather, the court held, the Rules do not contain a gap but are complete on
the admissibility of evidence. Any other interpretation would contravene
the basic spirit and provisions of the Rules. Therefore, the Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that the admissibility of expert testimony is
favored "whenever it is relevant and can be of assistance to the trier of
fact."
57
B. Comparison of the Williams Standard
with the Traditional Frye Standard
A basic comparison that can be made between the Williams standard
and the traditional "general acceptance" standard of Frye lies in the
distinct philosophies and attendant policy considerations upon which each
standard is predicated. The underlying philosophy of the Williams
standard is that the factfinder should make the crucial determination of the
credibility to be ascribed to novel scientific evidence. In contrast, the
underlying philosophy of Frye is that the judge should make a
predetermination because jurors lack sufficient capability and sophistica-
tion to assess accurately the weight of the evidence.
Various policy considerations are closely integrated with each
standard and underlying philosophy. Specific policy considerations
include the provision of: (1) a clear standard of review; (2) uniformity of
decision; (3) minimization of erroneous factual conclusions by the jury;
and (4) an adequate opportunity for defendant's rebuttal.
54. ME. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
55. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 53, at 79.




1. A Clear Standard of Review
A primary policy concern of the standard for the admission of newly
ascertained or newly applied scientific evidence is the desire for a clear
standard of review. The Frye standard has been criticized by commen-
tators as "somewhat lacking in definiteness"8 and "not enlightening as to
its details."5 9 The criticism was made, in large part, because of the
ambiguities and difficulties that arose in the application of the Frye
standard.60
The conclusion of the Williams court was reached, in part, because of
its recognition of the difficulties attendant upon the application of Frye.6'
The Williams test does provide a clearer standard of review. One objective
in the formulation of the Maine Rules of Evidence was to provide clear
rules understandable by both the bench and the practitioner. 62 The Rules
of Evidence provide specific guidelines for the admission of evidence.
Taken together with the language and underlying philosophy of Williams,
the standard gives less basis for equivocation than the multiplicity of
interpretations that have developed under Frye. Relevance and usefulness
to the trier of fact are generally established doctrines that contribute to the
workability of the standard.
2. Ensuring Uniformity of Decision
A second policy consideration is to ensure uniformity of decision.
Uniform results are, in part, a function of a clear standard of review. In
enumerating the advantages of the Frye standard, the California Supreme
Court. in People v. Kelly 63 included the promotion of uniformity of
decision. "Individual judges whose particular conclusions may differ
regarding the reliability of particular scientific evidence, may discover
substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific community." The
divergent results reached by various courts using the Frye standard belies
the statement of the Kelly court that uniformity is to be found in the
general acceptance test.
65
Relevance is a requirement that must be met by all evidence. The
necessity for relevance in every circumstance provides a uniform standard
for all evidence. Moreover, the Maine courts have become accustomed to
considering relevance under the Rules of Evidence. The determination of
relevance is well established, and would appear to be a practical standard
with which the courts can comfortably function.
58. Strong, supra note 1, at 11.
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 490.
60. See notes 27-40 and accompanying text supra.
61. 388 A.2d at 503 n.4.
62. Field, supra note 49, at 204-05.
63. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1976).
64. Id. at 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149, 549 P.2d at 1245.
65. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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3. Minimization of Erroneous Factual
Conclusions by the Jury
The policy of minimizing erroneous factual conclusions bears directly
on the underlying philosophy of whetherjudge orjury is more appropriate
to determine the probativeness of the evidence. When the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence is in issue, courts have been concerned with the
abilities of the jury, as factfinder, objectively to evaluate newly ascertained
or newly applied scientific principles.66• 67
In United States v. Addison, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals, a proponent of the Frye standard, articulated concern over the
ability of jurors to assess novel scientific evidence: "scientific proof may in
some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury
of laymen ... . Other courts similarly recognized a "danger that the
trial judge or jury will ascribe a degree of certainty to the testimony of the
expert . ..witness which may not be deserved. ' 69
The majority in Williams was also concerned with the effect of newly
ascertained or newly applied scientific principles on the jury. "[T]o avoid
prejudice which might arise because the assertion that the prin-
ciple . ..has a 'scientific' basis may import an objectivity which could
unduly influence the jury as a lay fact-finder .. , ,70 is an espoused
justification for the trial judge's consideration of general acceptance as a
component of the relevance and usefulness determination. There is a
dearth of definitive empirical evidence that bears on the capability ofjuries
to evaluate the weight of novel scientific evidence. 71
Both Frye and Williams expressed concern over the ability ofjuries to
assess accurately new scientific evidence; the two courts, however, do not
express the same degree of confidence in juries. Frye demonstrates little
confidence in the jury; Williams expresses greater, though not complete
confidence in the jury. Since both standards are premised on some degree
of doubt overjury capability, for purposes of discussion this Comment will
accept the premise that juries may be unable to assess accurately novel
scientific evidence.
The traditional standard reflects a conservative judicial posture that
has been both criticized72 and commended. 3 Since scientific principles and
techniques gain acceptance gradually over time, courts using the Frye
66. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 197, 327 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1975).
67. 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
68. Id. at 744.
69. Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 230, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1977);see also Huntingdon
v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (1966).
70. 388 A.2d at 504.
71. Statistics compiled from cases admitting spectrographic evidence fail to support the position
that juries are not able to evaluate adequately novel scientific evidence. See Greene, Voiceprint
Identification: The Case in Favor of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 171, 190-91 (1975).
72. United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
73. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1976),
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standard will be slower to receive the benefit of available but newly
developed types of evidence. The cautious nature of the standard may be
perceived as beneficial by those who believe it necessary to guard jurors
from undue influence by highly technical evidence. The evidence may
assume a position of unwarranted reliability to those not possessed of
scientific expertise. The standard is not necessarily effective since there
may be types of generally accepted evidence thatjuries are unable to assess
or types of evidence that have not attained general acceptance that thejury
could evaluate accurately.
Upon first appraisal it might appear that allowing the evidence to go
to the jury might result in prejudice induced by the alleged aura of novel
scientific evidence. Careful examination, however, indicates that this is not
the case. Under Williams, the trial judge gives careful consideration to
whether the preconditions to admissibility of relevance and usefulness
(and general acceptance to assist in the initial determination) have been
met. His consideration essentially creates a balance between the probative
value of the evidence and its possible prejudicial effects. This preliminary
balancing process protects the jury from unreliable evidence. In addition,
the jury may need less protection because the public is becoming more
sophisticated and knowledgeable of scientific matters. 74 Further, the
normal procedures of cross-examination and refutation aid the jury in
making an assessment of the evidence. As with all other expert opinion, the
jury would be apprised that it may accept or reject the expert testimony or
assign to it whatever weight the jury believes is merited. In the aggregate,
these procedures provided by Williams adequately ensure that the jury will
accurately evaluate the evidence, rather than be influenced by a "mystical
aura."
4. Defendant's Opportunity for Rebuttal
A fourth policy consideration underpinning admissibility of scientific
evidence is to provide the defendant with an adequate opportunity for
rebuttal. In United States v. Addison," the court emphasized that "since
scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen, the ability to produce rebuttal
experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a
particular technique, may prove to be essential. 7 6 Two factors are
important to the provision of an adequate opportunity for rebuttal.
First, there must be assurance of a minimal reserve of experts upon
which to draw.77 Under Frye, new scientific evidence is admissible when
74. Reed,- Practical Pitfalls in Handling Scientific Evidence, in ScIENTIFIC AND EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 31 (J. Cederbaums & S. Arnold eds. 1975).
75. 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
76. Id. at 744. See also Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223,232,369 A.2d 1277, 1282(1977).
77. Id. See also Coleman & Walls, The Evaluation of Scient(fic Evidence, 1974 CRiM. L. RE%,.
276, 280; Comment, Voiceprints-The Adnissibility Question: What Evidentiary Standard Should
Apply?, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 509, 528 (1975).
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the principle or technique has achieved general acceptance, not when only
a limited number of persons claim special knowledge concerning the
evidence. The Frye test protects both parties by assuring that a minimal
reserve of sufficiently qualified experts will be available. Under Williams,
in particular circumstances, emphasis may be placed on whether the
scientific matter at issue has been generally accepted or conforms to a
generally accepted explanatory theory. The preservation of the Frye
inquiry within the Williams standard provides the same protection for the
defendant by ensuring a minimal reserve of experts. In other circumstances
the judge, in his discretion, may not see fit to consider general acceptance.
It then might be less likely that an adequate reserve of experts would exist.
This possibility was not discussed by the Williams court and may be a
weakness of the standard. Procedures such as court appointment of an
expert s and exclusion of the evidence on secondary grounds79 are
available to ensure fairness to the opponent.
A second consideration is that the cost of obtaining expert rebuttal
may place a heavy financial burden on the defendant. Since novel scientific
evidence will more likely be admitted under Williams, the financial burden
of rebuttal will more frequently be imposed on defendant. This burden
may be alleviated somewhat by procedures derived extrinsically from the
standard. Some jurisdictions have appropriated funds to defray the cost of
an expert's court appearance.80 The court may appoint an expert when
only the proponents of a technique appear.81 When the defendant is the
proponent of the evidence, the state, as opponent, would have resources to
provide its own expert. 82
C. Implications of Williams for the Future
The Williams standard incorporates the Frye consideration of general
acceptance and it may be postulated that the difficulties of Frye will also be
78. ME. R. EvID. 706. See note 81 infra.
79. ME. R. EVID. 403. See note 54 supra.
80. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1.05, at 10 (2d ed,
1978).
81. FED. R. EvID. 706 and ME. R. EvID. 706 provide in part:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by
the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not
be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed
of his duties by the court. . . . A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings,
if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the [court]
or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling
him as a witness.
82. E.g., State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651,246 N.W. 314 (1933); Fiye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The general acceptance standard has been used primarily in criminal cases because
scientific evidence was more often presented there and because the policy considerations are more vital
when human liberty is at issue. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323,333,239 A.2d 680,685 (1968), aft'd, 56
N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). The use of scientific evidence in civil cases is increasing. MCCOaImICK,
supra note 3, § 206, at 503. It is uncertain to what extent, if any, a consideration of general acceptance
would be made in a civil case.
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incorporated. Since relevance and usefulness are the paramount criteria
for admissibility, however, the difficulties of Frye are minimized. The issue
may not arise in a particular case because consideration of general
acceptance is discretionary. If it should arise, general acceptance is a
concern inferior to that of relevance and usefulness. Even if the evidence is
not generally accepted, it may be admissible if relevant. Under Williams,
theory and device are considered in the same manner, eliminating some of
the technical difficulties of Frye.
Forty-five states adhere to the traditional standard for the admission
of novel scientific evidence.83 The standard utilized by three states is not
clearly ascertainable.8 4 Massachusetts has departed slightly from the
traditional standard. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a
"cautious first step"85 away from the Frye standard and held that "failure
to achieve the standard of general acceptance need not freeze the
evidentiary development of the polygraph . . ,86 The court concluded
that the general acceptance test may be adapted to allow admission of
novel scientific evidence in limited circumstances.87 The Massachusetts
position is more restrictive and closer to Frye than is Williams. Since the
traditional standard is currently applied in almost every jurisdiction, the
Williams decision is the first clear move to a significantly different standard
for the admission of novel scientific evidence.
The Williams relevance-usefulness standard for the admissibility of
newly ascertained or newly applied scientific principles is workable,
progressive, and preferable to that of Frye. The standard adopted by
Maine in State v. Williams will likely be the forerunner of a trend toward
accepting novel scientific evidence that is relevant and useful to the trier of
fact.
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Williams provides an excellent opportunity to reexamine and
analyze the evidentiary standards and considerations for the admissibility
of newly ascertained or newly applied scientific principles.
Technology has expanded dramatically since the day of Frye.
83. See, e.g., Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 838 (Ala. 1977); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,130 Cal.
Rptr. 144,549 P.2d 1240 (1976); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352,255 N.W.2d 171 (1977); State v.
Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134,560 P.2d 925 (1977); Trebotich v.
Broglio, 33 Ohio St. 2d 57,294 N.E.2d 669 (1973) (dicta); State v. Canaday,90 Wrash. 2d 808,585 P.2d
1185 (1978); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977).
84. Vermont, Delaware, West Virginia.
85. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421,432, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127 (1974).
86. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 592 (Mass. 1978).
87. Id. at 592 n.17. The limited circumstances require that (1) the defendant move that the
polygraph examination be conducted, (2) the defendant agree in advance that the test results would be
admitted regardless of the result, (3) thejudge inform defendant of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination, (4) the judge find that any waiver of constitutional right was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently, and (5) thejudge conduct voir dire inquiry to determine the qualifications
of the examiner and make findings thereon. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass.421,431-32,313
N.E.2d 120, 126-27. (1974).
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Increasingly sophisticated and reliable scientific methods are available for
the proof of facts. These principles and methods can be of great value to the
courts. Yet the Frye standard impeded the courts from deriving the full
benefit of newly ascertained or newly applied scientific principles. The
traditional standard reflected a lack of confidence in the ability of the jury
to assess accurately the probativeness of novel scientific evidence.
Inconsistencies and difficulties were present in the application of the
traditional standard.
The new Williams standard preserves an underlying philosophy of
greater confidence in the ability of jurors to evaluate wisely the evidence.88
The Williams standard provides a clear workable standard of review,
promotes uniformity of decision, maximizes correct factual conclusions by
the jury, and provides the defendant with a relatively adequate
opportunity for rebuttal. Admission of evidence that is relevant and useful
to the trier of fact, and consideration of general acceptance toward that
initial determination increase the likelihood that the benefits of novel
scientific evidence will be enjoyed while concurrently preserving
safeguards to preclude the introduction of unreliable evidence.
In view of the dissatisfaction with the Frye standard and the
advantages of the Williams standard, it is submitted that other
jurisdictions will adopt similar standards. In addition to serving as an
authority for a potential trend toward a standard of relevance, Williams
may also serve as the advent of the admissibility of evidence that has
previously been held inadmissible.
Betty R. Steingass
88. Field, supra note 49, at 224.
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